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2Abstract
Hungary is deemed to be one of the economies that has successfully undergone the 
changes needed to enter the European Union. Despite this, it has been pointed out that 
Hungarian managers are still lacking in education and training, that there is a lack of 
innovation, and that there is still a certain resistance to change manifest in the 
continuance of the ‘black market’ economy. However, it is optimistically expected 
that the influx of Western managerial practices will soon put this to rights (Agenda 
2000).
In this paper, we question these assumptions. Firstly, we argue that change is a more 
complex sociological and historical phenomenon than most organisational writers 
would have us believe. To illustrate this point, we draw on the work of the social 
historian Elias, who shows us that macro-societal developments and changes at the 
micro-level are interrelated. 
Following Elias, we then examine the nature of change at an institutional level in 
Hungary, set against the wider historical background that has shaped these changes. 
Then, drawing on literature and social research into values, we examine the nature of 
the Hungarian character, showing its development alongside and in tandem with the 
historical and institutional changes. What we find does not reflect the upbeat 
representation of the current Hungarian situation. Rather, using the language of Jung, 
we show that the particular historical changes that have taken place seem to have 
taken place at two levels, leading to a ‘split’ in Hungarian institutions (of which we 
consider the economy an example) and which is equally reflected by an ‘alienation’ in 
the Hungarian character. We question the notion that the practices recently being 
imported from the West will provide the solutions that the Hungarian economy is 
looking for. Indeed, there is a possibility that the wholesale importation of such 
practices may add to the ‘alienated’ nature of Hungarian organisations, and increase 
the split between the rulers and the ruled, whether we conceive of this at an 
institutional level, or at the level of the individual psyche.  We suggest that, without 
understanding these deeper issues, the simple importation of Western ideas is unlikely 
to address the need to implement lasting changes in organisations and to develop 
competent and creative managers. 
3Introduction
‘Nothing is permanent other than change’ said Heraclitos in Greece over 2000 years 
ago. Two millennia later this rings even truer. We are constantly dealing with change 
in all areas of life.  Thousands of books and workshops offer advice to cope with 
different aspects of change in our work and personal lives. At the beginning of the 21st 
century, it seems that the rate of change is accelerating, and this is particularly true in 
the workplace. For example, in an American survey, managers were asked about the 
change they observed in their work. In the 1970s 60% of the managers said that there 
was no change, 35% said that there was occasional, incremental change, and only 5% 
felt that work was full of continuous, overlapping change. By the 1990s only 1% of 
the respondents said that there was no change, 24% said that there was occasional, 
incremental change and 75% felt that work was full of continuous, overlapping 
change. ( Conner, 1993 quoted in Pataki, 1999)
This holds true in the East as well as the West. Indeed, in Central and Eastern 
European economies, change is reaching deep into the social institutions as well as 
organisational life.  Kocsis argues that: ‘We live in an era of constant change. It 
means that our managers [i.e. Hungarian managers] and indeed all managers of the 
European continent have to fight daily for survival, they have to develop continuously 
in other words they have to accommodate change constantly. Managers have to 
realise that change cannot be avoided or eliminated. We need to live with change and 
sometimes we need to initiate change so that we could achieve the desired results.’ 
( Kocsis, 1994 )
Further, this perceived need for change is set against a backdrop of significant and 
far-reaching constitutional, institutional and social change:
‘The history of Central Europe in the 20th century abounds in epoch making events. 
At the beginning of the century its features were determined by the power of a great 
empire, the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, to organise society and the economy; and 
the end of the century, imminent accession to the European Union is opening up new 
prospects for the nations of the region, including the Hungarians.’ (Berács and 
Chikán, 1999, p.13.)
Hungary is deemed to be one of the economies that has successfully undergone the 
changes required as entry to the European Union. In the last decade it has moved from 
command economy to market economy, from socialism to capitalism, from full 
employment to 10-14 % unemployment, from state ownership to private ownership, 
from mainly Hungarian-owned organisations to a great number of partly or fully 
foreign owned companies. Hungarian researchers claim that, whilst there are still 
changes to make, the transition of the Hungarian enterprise sector has been basically 
completed. According to the European Union’s Agenda 2000 Document, Hungary, 
along with the Czech Republic and Poland are countries which ‘present the 
characteristics of democracy, with stable institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, 
human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities. They can be regarded as 
functioning market economies, and should be able to compete the market forces 
within the Union in the medium term ( Agenda 2000, 1997). Despite this, it has been 
pointed out that Hungarian managers are still lacking in education and training, that 
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manifest in the continuance of the ‘black market’ economy. However, it is 
optimistically expected that the influx of Western managerial practices will soon put 
this to rights ( Agenda 2000).
In this paper, we question these assumptions. Firstly, we examine the nature of our 
understanding of  change in organisations. We argue that change is a more complex 
sociological and historical phenomenon than most organisational writers would have 
us believe. To illustrate this point, we draw on the work of the social historian Elias, 
who shows us that macro-societal developments and changes at the micro-level are 
interrelated. 
Following Elias, we then examine the nature of change at an institutional level in 
Hungary, set against the wider historical background that has shaped these changes. 
Then, drawing on literature and social research into values, we examine the nature of 
the Hungarian character, showing its development alongside and in tandem with  the 
historical and institutional changes. What we find does not reflect the upbeat 
representation of the current Hungarian situation. Rather, using the language of Jung, 
we show that the particular historical changes that have taken place seem to have 
taken place at two levels, leading to a ‘split’ in Hungarian institutions (of which we 
consider the economy an example) and which is equally reflected by an ‘alienation’ in 
the Hungarian character.  We suggest, that, without understanding these deeper issues, 
the simple importation of Western ideas is unlikely to address the need  to implement 
lasting changes in organisations and to develop competent and creative managers . 
1 The nature of change: an Eliasian approach
One of the major problems in organisational and cross-cultural theorising lies in the 
abiding sociological problem of addressing how the individuals shape institutions, and 
vice versa. For example, in cross-cultural organisational theorising, the culturalist 
perspective discusses values at the level of the individual  (core elements of culture) 
(e.g. Hofstede 1980)  whereas the macro-social processes,  are discussed in the 
institutionalist approach which focuses on institutions developed with industrialisation 
( education and training system, labour unions, financial system.) (e.g. Lane 1989) 
There is here a disjuncture between the institutional level and the cultural level, such 
that the processes by which one forms the other are lost. This means that much of the 
work lies in examining what is seen on the surface, and not on the underlying 
processes which create such situations. Until we understand the processes of change 
at this level, we are unlikely to come to an understanding of change at organisational 
level.  
The social historian Elias offers us a useful understanding. Through a careful 
comparison of the development of courtly society, Elias shows that macro-societal 
developments and changes at the micro-level are interrelated. He offers a multi-
levelled perspective that captures historical changes at the level of the nation and the 
level of individual identity. The ‘macro’ status of institutions is a processual 
achievement – that is to say, it is not a fixed entity, but should be conceived of as the 
result of a larger set of interdependent networks of human actors. What unites the 
modern self and state is the way both are constituted by the interdependence of 
individuals forced to devise modes of self-restraint. That is to say, the instincts and 
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processes such as table manners, etiquette, dance etc, so that unbound emotionality is 
repressed into culture’s artefacts.
Elias uses the term sociogenesis to refer to the way in which western (supposedly) 
‘civilised’ emotions and behaviour, tacit and conscious, have been learnt across the 
changing figurations of different epochs:
‘The specific process of “growing up” in Western societies… is nothing other than the 
individual civilising process to which each person, as a result of the social civilising 
process over many centuries, is automatically subjected from earliest childhood. The 
psychogenesis of the adult make-up in civilised society cannot, therefore, be 
understood if considered independently of the sociogenesis of our “civilization” 
(1994, x111).
Elias would point to the formation of a shared social ‘habitus’ or personality make-up 
that constitutes the basis of individual human conduct. The organisation of the 
psychological make-up was also, for Elias, a continuous process, which began at birth 
and continued throughout life. The ways in which the formation of habitus changes 
over time    (psychogenesis) can only be properly understood in connection with the 
changes in the surrounding social relations (sociogenesis).
Elias argues that as societies become more complex, two things happen: the human 
psyche undergoes differentiation, and, following Freud’s model, the ego and 
superego, (which have the effect of exerting control over feelings and behaviour) 
become more distinct from the id, which expresses instinctual drives such as 
aggression and sexual desire. Secondly monopolies of economic resources and 
physical force come into being. As people try to ensure their own survival and, the 
superego becomes stronger, instinct is regulated by foresight (Smith, 1998). 
For Elias:
‘The structures of the human psyche, the structures of human society and the 
structures of human history are indissolubly complementary and can only be studied 
in conjunction with each other.’ (Elias, 1991)
However, whilst the institutions and psyche develop concomitantly, the outcomes are 
largely ‘unintended consequences’. As he puts it:
‘It is simple enough: plans and actions, the emotional and rational impulse of 
individual people, constantly interweave in a friendly or hostile way. This basic tissue 
resulting from many single plans and actions of men can give rise to changes and 
patterns that no individual person has planned or created. From this interdependence 
of people arises an order of generis, an order more compelling and stronger than the 
will and reason of the individual people composing it. It is this order of interweaving 
human impulses and strivings, this social order, which determines the course of 
historical change; it underlies the civilizing process. ‘(Elias, 1994).
For Elias :
6‘The task of sociological research is to make these blind uncontrolled processes more 
accessible to human understanding by explaining them, and to enable people to 
orientate themselves within the interwoven social web  – which, though created by 
their own needs and actions, is still opaque to them – and so better to control it.’ ( 
Elias 1978, )
Elias’s civilisation theory reminds us of the importance of pre-industrial patterns, 
which evolve outside the economic. These can be traced to the battlefield, the castle, 
the court, and the salon. They may well still be recognised in the offices of Chinoin or 
on the football pitch in Budapest. These values are acquired so early they often 
remain unconscious and can only be inferred from the way people act under certain 
circumstances. However, it is the values that drive behaviour, which in its turn builds 
institutions. 
 Elias’s contribution here, suggests Van Iterson et al ( 1998) may be twofold. The 
modern state apparatus in the Western world is to a considerable extent to be 
understood as the – unintended – outcome of the power struggles of the different 
groups, fought out in the courts or in opposition to it. Secondly, these ideas and values 
in which these struggles find expression evolved into ‘national’ concepts which 
partially came to guide governmental policies. Since the levels of analysis in the 
civilising process are interrelated, it is obvious that different routes to state formation 
have also had consequences for the development of manners and morality, and also 
conscience and personality.
The added value of Elias’s perspective in analysing national behavioural principles 
lies in the sociogenesis of the values: these values are formed in reciprocity with the 
process of state formation and the formation of social norms with regard to thinking, 
feeling and behaving for courtly aristocratic elites, higher civil servants and other 
leading bourgeois groups. ‘The long-term perspective on the social constitution of 
values, in interdependence with military, political, judicial, administrative and court 
life processes provides, according to Van Iterson et al, ‘an valuable enrichment of our 
comprehension of the development of organisational practices and beliefs’ ( Van 
Iterson et al 1998).
In this paper, we attempt to understand the institutional changes at the level of the 
history and the economy and to explore this in relationship to the development of the 
Hungarian personality. We then go on to look at the implications of this for 
Hungarian organisations.  
2 The long-term picture: patterns in Hungarian history
Hungarian history is characterised by short periods of optimism, sometimes enjoying 
great power, but  the primary characteristic is one of living under foreign power. Over 
the past 500 years, 150 years have been lived under Turkish power, 200 years under 
Austrian power and 40 years under the Soviet rule. Major historical events are listed 
in the appendix. 
Servitude and freedom: in the shadow of the oppressor
7In 950 20,000 horsemen under the leadership of Arpad came and settled in the 
Carpathian basin. Up until the end of the 14th century, they expanded their territory 
and became a powerful nation, culminating in the rich Renaissance court of Matthias 
Hunyadi Corvinus. This court was visited by many humanists of the period, rich in 
poetry (1458-1490). Under Matthias, a core mercenary army was constructed, and 
modern managerial practices were established to control and impose taxes on the 
Hungarian economy. Such a period established the strong cultural tradition, which, 
despite political and economic upheavals, has created the independent and proud 
spirit, which still exists among Hungarians today.
However, from 1526 apart from short periods, the Hungarians were under the sway of 
Turks, Austrians or Russians. Yet at the same time, Hungarians seem to have 
established a way of being that ensures that, whilst under the rule of foreign peoples, 
they have still retained a strong sense of national identity, somehow vicariously 
enjoying the prestige and power of the oppressor.  For example, the compromise of 
1867, brought to an end active revolutionary change, and Hungary tied herself to the 
creation of a dual state with Austria.  Even while the aristocratic elements of the 
Hungarian nation enjoyed this vicarious power, it is said that passive resistance 
developed to such a state of obsession during this period,  through obstinate daily 
confrontation with the foreign state power that its effect is felt today; for example, the 
ways of outwitting customs, of smuggling goods across borders, of concealing income 
and not paying taxes, of distilling brandy clandestinely of deceiving administrative 
bureaus at every step – not considered immoral actions but honourably national 
exploits. This uneasy alliance brought with it relative peace and wealth, but, as in 
other periods of history, when war came, Hungary has no choice but to join on the 
side of their ally and to fight for an Austrian victory. As a  result of being on the 
losing side, Hungary  lost two thirds of its territory. This meant that whole regions of 
Hungarian towns and cities were given to the neighbouring countries. It is worth 
remembering that the shock of this Trianon treaty (1920) is barely one generation 
away.
History in the 20th century repeated itself very quickly and in 1939, due to its 200-
year-old association with Austria, and geographical location, Hungarians found 
themselves  on the losing  side of the war again. However, when they wanted to exit 
from the proceedings in it became occupied by Germany from March 1944.  From 
autumn 1944 Hungary became a battle field of Russian and German troops. At the 
end of the war the Russians took almost 700,000 Hungarian hostages including 170-
180 000 civiliants, and deported them to various labourcamps in Russia. The British 
took about 300 000 Hungarian hostages. 200 000 of them were released by 1947. 
According to the available data only 450-470 000 Hungarian hostages were released 
from the Russian labour camps finally in  1951. (L. Izsák, 1998) This resulted not 
only in the loss of lives, homes and territories but also the  much tighter political, 
economic and  social control of the  winning Russian army. 
After the euphoria of peace and the end of fascism, Hungarians had very little time to 
celebrate life and freedom. They had to face dramatic changes under socialism, 
adjusting to the new rules and rulers. It is this period that we wish to analyse in more 
depth. 
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The period of Hungarian history between 1948 and 1989 has been given many 
different labels. The most neutral titles are the Soviet era, the era of socialism, the era 
of command economy. The most frequently used colloquial reference for this period 
is the ‘cursed era’. We draw on the work and language of Elemér Hankiss (1990) who 
wrote an in-depth study on the topic and whose clear explanations and arguments 
helped us to understand the complexities of Hungary’s recent past.
From ‘paralysis’ to ‘liberalism’
1948-1965 The paralysed society
The new political leadership after the communist take-over in 1948 was very different 
from what Hungarians had experienced before. These people had 
been trained in the military discipline of Leninism-Stalinism, in the conviction that 
they had unconditionally to subject themselves to the will of the party. They 
considered themselves as the local representatives of world communism led by the 
Soviet Union and had plans to build a future socialist and communist society in one or 
two decades. They felt they did not need the co-operation of the people, which they 
could not expect anyway, but the power to keep them in fold. (Hankiss, 1990). Further 
most of these leaders had come back to Hungary from two decades of emigration and 
they were out of touch with and very suspicious of almost the whole society. They 
talked of Hungary as a ‘fascist nation’, the ‘last satellite of Nazi Germany’; as a 
society that had been enslaved by a century of feudo-capitalist rule and had been 
poisoned for centuries by Catholic and other churches.
Whilst they did not have parliamentary majority, they needed unlimited freedom to do 
what they felt was right to accomplish their historical mission. Consequently there 
was a move to ‘atomise’ and fragment the different groups in Hungarian society.
A great deal of secrecy surrounded the ruling elite. According to a survey the ruling 
class consisted of about 500,000 members (Bihari, 1989) but there were only 50-100 
people in its heart and only about 24,000-25,000 were in decision making position at 
national or local level.
From 1947 civil rights such as participation, representation, the right to strike; the 
rights of association, freedom of conscience and expression; the right to choose one’s 
job or citizenship were suspended.  By 1949 91% of employees in ministries and 
national public administration agencies were party members. ( Petö and Szakács, 
1985 quoted in Hankiss, 1990).
The party had total control of the mass media. They nationalised the industrial and 
commercial organisations, and most of church activities were banned.
Another powerful strategy that was used to increase control was the uprooting of 
people: ‘to force them out of their traditional jobs, identities, and environments; to 
force them into new jobs and new environments, depriving them this way, of their 
skills, expertise and self-consciousness’ (Hankiss, 1990 p.28) 
Tamás Kolosi (1982), in his study of the restratification of Hungarian society at this 
time, writes in this connection: ’In the period between the late 1940s and the mid-60s, 
70 per cent of the Hungarian population worked in an occupational category different 
9from that in which they, or their fathers, had worked before. Labour mobility of the 
same magnitude took 100 years in Great Britain and 80 years in Germany; in Hungary 
it was collapsed into 15 years.’
The dogma of ’common interest’, ’collective interest’ ’the commonweal’  gained 
legitimacy and private and group interests were suppressed and eradicated. Even if 
people did not accept this doctrine, they were confused and paralysed by its intensive 
dissemination. (Hankiss, 1990, p.32)
The ruling elite disintegrated and atomised society by forcing people to withdraw into 
their private lives, and by disrupting social networks it hoped to push society into 
their direction. Paradoxically, despite  the collectivistic rhetoric of the Communist 
Party, the whole economic and social situation in the 1960s and 1970s pushed people 
towards privatism and individualism. Whilst they could not participate in public life  
they started to take advantage of the growing economic prosperity and started to 
increase their living standards and lifestyles.
1965–1985 ‘Liberalised Society’ 
Despite this social background, economic performance in the 1960s and 1970s was 
good in Hungary and it led to a liberalisation process. However, Hankiss makes a very 
clear distinction between liberalisation and democracy.  In democracy institutional 
systems are created, based on real power, that guarantees the rights stipulated in the 
constitution of the community.  ‘Liberalisation, on the other hand, works without 
rights. This is the political acrobatics of giving people more and more leeway without 
releasing the leash…. The Hungarian leadership was able, or willing, only to 
“liberalise” the country, not to liberate it. This policy of liberalisation led the country 
into a dangerous impasse. The leadership was able, or willing, to implement only half-
hearted measures.’ ( Hankiss, 1990, pp.54-55). The ruling elite slowly increased the 
number of things that were permitted, the space where people could feel themselves 
more or less free, but did not give the rights to guarantee these new opportunities. So 
it was only a temporary and conditional suspension of the restrictions and control. 
People lived in constant uncertainty because they had no idea when the ‘masters’ 
would change the rules and introduce tighter measures again.
What was now permitted? Everything allowed related to the gradual development and 
flourishment of the second economy. People were allowed to set up various 
enterprises and operate them in their free time. This enabled families to earn more and 
increase their living standards.
Gábor (1983) gave the following key characteristics of the second economy:
1. The second economy was the sum total of economic activities outside the state 
sector; it was only loosely integrated into it
2. It was not planned and organised by the state.
3. It was a more or less informal economy; it was only partially affected by the 
formal system of regulation that controlled the first economy.
4. It was not linked to the dominant form of ownership i.e. to state ownership.
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5. It was not linked to the dominant form of management, i.e. to large enterprises; it 
was based on small-scale co-operative enterprises and mainly on family 
enterprises.
6. Contrasting with the first economy, it had ‘hard budget constraints’; it was cost-
effective; it lay outside the sphere of state investment policy.
7. It was less affected by the hierarchical structures characteristic of the regime than 
the first economy.
8. It was an important but not a dominant activity within the national economy; it was 
of a complementary character.
9. It was an ‘invisible’ or less visible, economy generating incomes that could not be, 
or were only partly registered by the tax office.
10. Its political and ideological assessment by the authorities was precarious and 
ambivalent.
The rules, the norms and the networks for the second economy evolved gradually in 
the shadow of the first economy. Parallel to the economic development we can 
observe a social life and social developments that are quite separate from the ‘official 
society’. Hankiss calls it the second society. The two economies and societies 
intertwined in many ways, they could not actually function without each other. In 
some cases they complemented each other in other cases they became each other’s 
obstacles.
The crisis 
With the growth of the second economy and the increasing problems of the first the 
power of the ruling elite gradually started to decline in all fronts. By this time the 
ideology had totally lost its relevance. The strongly centralised organisational system 
had the tendency to overregulation and bureaucratisation and was also characterised 
by nepotistic networks. Owing to these and other factors the ruling elite became less 
and less able to govern the country. Decisions were indefinitely delayed ; decisions 
taken were not implemented; contradictory regulations were introduced; plans were 
not achieved; economic decline could not be halted . From the late 1960s the party 
unity also started to weaken and by the 1980s the struggle became quite apparent 
between the reformists and anti-reformist members of the party.
As a result this led to a crisis in values.  As Hankiss points out: ‘If people are deprived 
of their values, if they cannot rely on a relatively strong and consistent value system, 
they lose one of the most important organising principles and regulatory forces in 
their lives. If their values are destroyed, it will be much more difficult for them to 
preserve their moral integrity and their sense of social responsibility. This is what 
happened in Hungary after 1948. The destruction was far-reaching or almost total. As 
a consequence of this destruction, Hungarian society is still now in profound spiritual 
and moral disarray….The destruction was systematic and wide-ranging. Traditional 
value-generating institutions (churches, communities, associations, social movements) 
were dismantled or paralysed; families were disintegrated; traditional values were 
stigmatised, persecuted, driven underground; their followers were harassed, 
intimidated; people were indoctrinated against their own value beliefs and 
convictions; believers were forced to abjure their beliefs, teachers were forced to 
teach lies etc.’( Hankiss, 1990 pp121-122)
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The new regime, however, failed to provide a sustainable new value system in its 
place. They could not bridge the gap between the ideology and the everyday practice 
or the implementation of that ideology. It only produced macro-social and political 
values but failed to generate values indispensable in everyday life, in family life, in 
personal relationships, values relating to questions of life and death. 1
The political, economic, social and cultural crises mutually reinforced one another. 
These areas were so intertwined that the crisis was practically unmanageable.
By the end of the 1980s social responsibility has been almost totally destroyed. 
Further, as the communities were disintegrated people lost their sense of ownership 
and became demotivated and did not look after the properties of the community. 
Many individuals lost their inner capacity to act in a responsible way. These was no 
predictability. The lack of continuity, the permanent changing of the rules of play, 
overregulation combined with underregulation, and the chaotic interaction of 
incompatible organisational principles made the prediction of the consequences of 
one’s acts, and hence responsible action impossible.
After the euphoria of 1989 different types of aid programmes started to pour into the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Some countries gave money to help to 
develop the infrastructure, others gave computers and machinery to specific 
institutions and there were some that offered help in the form of knowledge about 
managerial practices. Consultants started to appear with both at government and 
organisational levels. 
At an economic level, it is broadly agreed amongst researchers and commentators that 
the transition to a market economy has taken place (Budapest University of Economic 
Sciences, 1998). In the transition period the legal and regulatory environment has 
been characterised by the following factors:
• increasing autonomy by privatisation
• globalisation of economic activities
• key role of Foreign Direct Investment in the modernisation process
In 1989 20% of the population  was employed by the private sector. By 1994 this 
figure was 65%. The private sector’s contribution to GDP grew from 20% to 56% 
during the same period.
In the first instance these projects were very welcomed and there were high 
expectations and a level of naïve hope that by following the Western advisors things 
could improve dramatically. However, at a social and political level, the picture does 
not appear so rosy. Unemployment has reached 10-14%, as opposed to zero 
unemployment, there is a major reduction in social welfare and security (under the 
Soviets, spending on social welfare was at the same level as that of Sweden), lack of 
job security, increasing gap between the rich and the poor. Free higher education and  
health care has been abolished and people now have to pay market prices for 
medicines. ( Kornai, J. 1995, Illes 1998).
Despite the optimism of the economic and business indicators, some warning signals 
that all is not rosy show that in the workplace there is a high resistance to new market 
techniques, lack of innovation, low morale, and ‘low ethics’ (Illes and Rees 2000). 
We shall refer to this later. 
1 It may also be worth noting here how such a phenomenon backs up Elias’s understanding.  The 
evolvement of institutions and values is inextricably interlinked: one cannot evolve without the other.
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The change process in Hungary: the eruption of the shadow
The above discussion has shown to some degree the nature of the change process in 
Hungary. Although many commentators declare that the change from 1989 has been 
rapid and radical, we can see, with  that the roots of the change process were already 
in place by the nature of the ‘silent’ growth of the second economy. However, it is 
clear that this growth has not been abundant or full. It has, like much of Hungarian 
history, existed alongside the elite who have the real political clout, and there has 
been little real power in this growth.  If we take a longer-term view, we can see that 
patterns of change here, reflect and reinforce patterns of change that are apparent 
throughout Hungarian history.
In our examination of the recent past in Hungarian history, it struck us that the 
language of Jung can help us understand what seemed to be happening in Hungary in 
these years, and that his notion of the ‘shadow’ could be a useful tool of analysis, both 
and the level of the institution and at the level of the individual. 2For  Jung, 
expressions of the collective unconscious, passed down through generations are 
encapsulated in his notion of the ‘archetype’ of which the shadow is one 
example(Stevens, 1990). Archetypes are enduring, slow to change, and we believe 
that, to help us understand change processes better, we would do best to realise that 
real change at the level of a nation and society, as Elias shows us,  is slow and evolves 
over a very long period of time. 
Let us first examine how Jung conceptualised the notion of the shadow. In early 
childhood, the persona grows out of a need to adapt to the expectations of parents, 
teachers and society in the course of growing up. When growing up young children 
quickly learn that certain qualities are regarded as desirable, while others are not. 
Qualities perceived as undesirable, unacceptable or reprehensible are repressed or 
hidden from view. These form a complex which Jung called the shadow. The shadow, 
however has its archetypal core, it is the archetype of the enemy, the treacherous 
stranger, and is part of the human being’s adaptive equipment. The shadow archetype 
is active in early life since it is a matter of survival for all young animals to possess a 
programmed wariness of anything strange that may be potentially hostile. As time 
goes by, this archetype becomes fleshed out with personality qualities, which are 
rejected by the parents or school as unacceptable (Stevens 1990).This is in a  way an 
adaptive compromise between the society and the developing Self. 
If this shadow aspect is not given conscious expression as an adult, then it manifests 
itself in unintegrated ways such as passive behaviour or outbursts of anger as a 
reaction to events – or it could emerge as bursts of highly creative energy, manifest in 
artistic, intellectual or practical work. The task of the individual later in life is to 
attempt to acknowledge and integrate these ‘shadow’ aspects into full expression as 
2
 We are not the first to begin to use Jungian concepts at a collective or organisational level Kaj 
Noschis (1992) in her book on the organisational shadow noted that “ … Jung himself did not hesitate 
occasionally to apply some of his psychological categories to entire populations.  For instance, he 
discusses differences between east and West in terms of his typology or refers to capitalism and 
communism as being each other’s shadow ([Jung, (1957) the Undiscovered Self. London, Rouledge 
and kegan Paul, 1975 par.544]…I do not have a more convincing argument for making this leap from 
individual to organisational psychology than Jung had in moving from individual to group level.
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an autonomous individual,  thereby eliminating the negative behaviours and giving 
the positive elements more focussed expression. This process  Jung called 
‘individuation’. Only by integrating  our persona with our shadow do we become full 
and rounded individuals, autonomous beings. 
We can extend this notion of the shadow to interpret how Hungarian institutions have 
developed. We have seen how historically, whilst ruling elites of other nations have 
developed laws and regulations, Hungarians have ‘silently’ developed their own 
sometimes co-operatively, sometimes manipulating and attempting to defeat the 
system. This is particularly evident under the Soviets. We have seen how the ‘second 
economy’ developed, yet without the real power or freedom to act. The shadow, 
whilst potentially powerful, remains under the surface and undifferentiated. 
However, the shadow has also erupted at various points in attempts to reassert itself, 
albeit unsuccessfully. Whilst it would appear that Hungarians have been ‘silent’ or 
lacking in power, the sense of identity, and rich cultural history, that can be traced 
back to the Magyars, and to the court of Matthias has asserted itself at various points 
in her history. Ever since defeat and rule by the Turks, Hungary has felt itself to be 
behind the West, and has tried to catch up.  This has been instigated by the country’s 
elites, who have at various times attempted to implement different programmes to this 
end. The first programme was launched during the reforms of 1830s and 40s. Its main 
objectives were independence from the Habsburgs, modernisation of agriculture, and 
the development of a British-or French-type parliamentary system. This revolutionary 
aim was defeated by the Austrian and Russian armies in 1849. The next attempt 
started in 1867 when the country won semi-independence from the Austria. The 
country developed economically and also managed to develop the institutions of a 
modern European society. But the semi-independent status did not allow the 
development of a genuinely democratic political system. 
The First World War led the country to a total disaster. The conservative governments 
of the 1920s  followed two short-lived revolutionary attempts ( the social democratic 
experiment in 1918, and the communist one in 1919) and run aground into the 
economic crisis of the 1930s.  The populist and technocratic-bureaucratic experiments 
of the late 1930s and 1940s were interrupted by the Fascist take-over. The democratic 
experiment after the war , with a multi-party parliamentary system a halt in 1948, 
when the communists took over power. The Stalinist programme, with its one party 
system, ruthless despotism, and centralised planning economy began to falter in 1954 
and crashed in 1956.  The post-totalitarian experimentation, with an enlightened, 
pragmatic, and paternalistic authoritarianism, and its politics of liberalisation, was 
between 1965 and 1975 the most successful East European model, but began to 
malfunction seriously in the late 1970s, was heading towards a general crisis during 
the 1980s and crashed in 1989, as we have already seen. 
‘This is the sad and discouraging record of a nation which has launched frequent 
attempts to catch up with the West, to increase its own prosperity, to broaden its 
freedom, and which has repeatedly failed’. ( Hankiss, 1990 pp 82-83)
Using the metaphor of the shadow, then, we would argue that change in Hungary is 
not as dramatic or radical as many commentators may have us believe. Whilst the 
superficial changes may appear radical, there is a real danger that the Hungarian 
nation may repeat patterns of collusion and compromise that have sustained it over 
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the past 500 years. We noted earlier that the task of the individual in life was to 
assimilate and transform where necessary the energy of the shadow, in balance to the 
persona. We would suggest that Hungary is so steeped in patterns of repression, that it 
would require a thorough, long-term plan of assimilation before the ideas of the West, 
where appropriate, may be assimilated with the rich, though silent, history of 
Hungary. 
This is not to say that Hungary is any more or less ‘civilised’ than its European 
partners. Just as Jung pointed out that communism and capitalism represented each 
other’s shadow, so we may argue that Hungary and her oppressors act as each other’s 
shadow.  We have already seen that over 500 years ago, Hungary was already the 
centre of European culture and education. If Hungary could find her way back to her 
rich roots by connecting with that archetype, then she can find a way of transforming 
those energies bottled up over the past 500 years.. Historically, Hungary had already 
demonstrated the qualities necessary for cultural growth. The journey ahead, if she 
can tap into these archaic resources, could indeed be fascinating. Hungary is not 
‘behind’ her European sisters, but merely at a different crossroads. So Jung pointed 
out:
 ’…it is not only primitive man whose psychic processes are archaic.  The civilized 
man of today shows these archaic processes as well, and not merely in the form of 
sporadic “throw-backs” from the level of modern social life. On the contrary, every 
civilized human being, whatever his conscious development, is still an archaic man at 
the deeper level of his psyche. Just as the human body connects us with the mammals 
and displays numerous relics of earlier evolutionary stages going back even to the 
reptilian age, so the human psyche is likewise a product of evolution which when 
followed up to its origins, shows countless archaic traits…When questionned as to the 
distinction between good and bad a negro chieftain declared: “ When I steal my 
enemy’s wives, it is good, but when he steals mine, that is bad’…Primitive man is no 
less prompt than we are to value an ethical attitude.  His good is just as good as ours, 
and his evil is just as bad as ours.  Only the forms under which good and evil appears 
are different; the process of ethical judgement is the same.” ( C.G. Jung, 1933, 
pp.144-147)
We saw from Elias that institutions develop intimately with the individual psyche, and 
it is to this that we now turn to complete our analysis. 
4 The development of the Hungarian character
One of the features of  the post-war period in Hungarian history is that people 
retreated into their inner worlds or into the second economy. In this section, we 
examine the values of the Hungarian people, and also how the Hungarian character is 
traditionally represented in Hungarian literature. 
We saw how the post-war government atomised and fragmented a great deal of 
Hungarian society, resulting in a ’retreat’ into a private and inner world. The ruling 
elite used stigmatisation to deprive people of their identity. Class identities, which had 
been an especially important source of self-respect and autonomy, were replaced by 
feelings of guilt. Blue-colour workers for example were called ‘lumpenproletariat’, 
farmers were called ‘kulaks’ and those who belonged to the intelligentsia were 
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stigmatised as ’lackeys of the capitalists’. Pride in the original national identity was 
also taken away by calling Hungarians indiscriminately  ‘a nation of fascists, or  ‘the 
last satellites of Hitler’.
Such class, work and national identities were substituted by pseudo-identities in the 
form of slogans such as ‘We are the country of steel and iron’, ‘We are the nation of 
Nobel prize winners’, ‘We are the East European success story’ or ‘We are a great 
sports power.’
People were forced to participate in rituals celebrating the party, the party leaders and 
the Soviet Union, and if people made mistakes, they were forced to revile themselves 
and to repent their ‘sins’ publicly. 
It is not surprising that people became very demoralised and went into withdrawal. As 
a silent protest and a way of self-protection people withdrew   into inner emigration, 
privatism, consumerism, into political indifference or into alcoholism.
As Hankiss pointed out:
’To act, people need a feeling of social identity. If deprived of this identity they will 
be lamed or paralysed; they will be less able to act in a conscious and responsible 
way. … For forty years, it was impossible or dangerous for people to identify 
themselves with social roles like “I am a member of the middle class, “I am a social 
democrat” ,  “I am a Calvinist”, “I am a citizen” etc.’( Hankiss, 1990 pp36-37).
The extreme individuation of Hungarian society is well illustrated by the European 
Value Systems Study, which was conducted in 1982 in thirteen countries. For 
example to the question:’Is there anything you would sacrifice yourself for, outside 
your family?’ 85% of Hungarians said ’No’. When the same question was asked in 
Britain, France, Spain, Denmark or Belgium the negative answers were between 38-
64%.
To the question: ’Would you raise your children in respect of other people?’ the 
European average of positive answers was between 43 and 62%, while the 
corresponding Hungarian figure was 31%.
To the question ’How do you prefer to spend your leisure time?’  72 % of Hungarians 
chose the family. The other alternatives were, alone, with friends, going out. From the 
other European countries 39-53% chose the family as a preferred way to spend 
leasure time with. (EVSS,1985)
Whilst people enjoyed relative security and well being, they knew that they could not 
influence the country’s politics or economics so they hoped that those in power would 
make the right decisions for all. A quarter of a century of paternalistic rule has left its 
imprint on people’s minds and attitudes and Hankiss refers to this attitude as one of  
‘infantilism’ which  became a national syndrome in Hungary ( Hankiss, 1982). A 
national survey in 1985 showed that only 10% of adults believed that they could do 
something against measures that offend their interest. In developed countries the 
positive answer was 50% and in developing countries the average was 28%. ( Bruszt, 
1988).
The following table illustrates very well what Bruszt calls the  ‘without us but for us’ 
syndrome in Hungary. It means that in the mid-eighties people felt that knew that they 
had hardly any say in the decision-making process but they believed that the leaders 
of the country would take the people’s interest into consideration.
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The ‘without us but for us’ syndrome
Statement % of people who 
agree with the 
statement in respect 
of: work place
% of people who 
agree with the 
statement in respect 
of: municipality
% of people who 
agree with the 
statement in respect 
of: national politics
Your interests play 
an important role in 
decision-making
60 57 68
You are satisfied 
with the way things 
are going in 
Hungary
62 45 55
The situation of 
democracy is good 
in Hungary
62 55 70









( Source: Bruszt 1988 pp61-67)
It is interesting to note that the suicide rate and the alcohol consumption more than 
doubled between 1950 and 1984 ( Andorka and Harcsa 1986) indicating a 
pathological response to unfavourable and oppressive socio-economic conditions.
The Hungarian character in history: the individual shadow
Forty years of Soviet rule have obviously left their mark on the Hungarian nation. We 
believe, however, that these patterns of behaviour go back much further than this 
period. Our aim here is to show patterns of collusion go back much further, and have 
become deeply embedded in the Hungarian psyche. Although we can see from our 
discussion of recent history how these values have developed, a review of Hungarian 
literature gives a richer picture of how Hungarians tend to perceive themselves. We 
have identified four characteristics, which tend to recur in literature. These are: fight 
for survival; procrastination and drifting; neurotic competition; martyrdom and guilt.
Fight for survival
This  is a theme that is  well represented in literature. 
Gárdonyi’s The Stars of Eger is an epic about the Hungarians heroic fight against the 
Turks. The Turkish army is bigger, better equipped but the Hungarians win in the end 
because the truth is on their side and they are braver and brighter than the enemy is. 
They are fighting for their homeland whereas the Turks are invadors. In the novel the 
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Turks are depicted as stupid and cowardly and they are a target for many  practical 
jokes.
Jókai’s novels talk about the heroism, loyalty and high moral standards of the 
Hungarians who fight against the Austrians. Outwitting the Austrians is a virtue. The 
Austrians are described as weak and pathetic. They make plot after plot against the 
Hungarians but in the end the victory is always on the side of the truth. And truth is 
with the Hungarians. If they can’t win in the battle they have the moral victory and 
gives them strength for future fights.
One of the most famous texts in Hungarian history written in the 19th century  is the 
The Tragedy of Man written by Madach. The theme of this work is the constant 
struggle of human beings for survival. The drama follows the history of mankind. The 
scenes change from ancient history to more recent but the players and the problems 
are very similar. The final line of the drama serves as a motto for  mankind and it is an 
encouragement for the Hungarians:
‘I’ve told you, Man:  have faith and do your best!’.(Madach,1993)
Drifting, procrastination
Sándor Petöfi : ‘Pató Pál ur’
This is a satiric poem about a miserable fellow who lives in his village without a wife. 
His house is collapsing because he does not do any maintanence . His garden and his 
fields are equally abandoned, the servants are not working and you can see nothing 
but weeds. Although he has fine material he is in shabby clothes because he is too 
lazy to call a tailor. The ironic message is the inability of the Hungarian to take proper 
care of themselves, as exemplified in Hungarian history. His motto for life written at 
the end of each verse is : ’Oh,  we have time there is no need to rush.’
The last verse of the poem universalises the theme: 
He lives his life like this,
Though his ancestors left him abundance 
He never has anything.
But it is not his fault ( says the poet)
He was born to be Hungarian
And in his country it is an ancient slogan
’Oh, we have time there is no need to rush’( Petöfi, 1960)
The poem was written in 1847 just before the 1848 revolution. Petöfi was one of the 
initiators and leaders of this revolution for freedom. He wrote his poems in simple 
Hungarian because he wanted to speak to the whole nation. He died during the 
revolution and became a national hero. His poems are so popular that they are often 
mistaken for folk songs. He was obviously angry about the negligence and 
procrastinating attitude of his countrymen.
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Neurotic competition
János Arany: ‘Fülemüle’ 
Arany was Petöfi’s friend and contemporary. He has the reputation as being one of 
the most sophisticated Hungarian poets with the largest active vocabulary.
The title of the poem is ‘The Nightingale’ (Arany, 1964).  It is a satire about two bad 
neighbours who got into dispute about the song of a nightingale. The two neighbours 
are called Paul and Peter. There was a walnut tree in Paul’s garden and one of the 
branches bent over Peter’s garden. As Peter benefited from the nuts he did not 
complain.
One day a nightingale settled on this particular branch and started to sing. Both Paul 
and Peter were out in their gardens and enjoyed the song. Paul stated that the song 
was his because the nightingale sat on his tree. Peter argued that the song was actually 
his because the branch that the bird sat on was in his territory.
The two neighbours bit each other up in the heat of the argument and each decided to 
take his case to court.
They presented their version of the truth individually and both of them bribed the 
judge with a piece of gold coin. The judge put Peter’s coin into his left pocket and 
Paul’s into his right pocket. He looked through all the legal books and as  none of 
them made any references to such a bizarre case, he made the verdict himself. 
According to the Judge, the nightingale sang neither to Peter nor to Paul but to the 
judge, as is apparent from the fact that he has money in both of his pockets. In the last 
verse of the poem Arany states ironically that such things of course would not happen 
any more. Noone would take a neighbour to court for a petty issue because people 
love and respect each other these days.
The poem was written in 1854 not long after the revolution when censorship was 
particularly strict. Not surprising that Arany told his critique in the form of a tale. You 
can read the story at two different levels. If you look at the words only it is nothing 
more than an anecdotal story from the past. When you look beneath the words it is 
like a sad mirror shown to all Hungarians who weaken the nation by fighting against 
each other and as a result strengthen the enemy. 
Martyrdom and guilt
Folk Ballad: Kömüves Kelemen
This famous folk ballad reveals some of the shadow side of the Hungarian character 
in the sacrifices made to work, which are ascribed to fate.  
The ballad is about a group of builders who took on the major work of building the 
castle of Déva. They start to work enthusiastically because the agreed payment is 
good, however what they build during the day falls off in the evening. They try it 
again and again but the mortar can’t keep the bricks together. They do not know what 
to do. They have to build the castle because they need the payment for their families. 
They refer to an old bricklayers’ myth   and agree that whoever’s wife will come to 
the castle first will have to be sacrificed for the sake of the project. After a while the 
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families are getting worried at home as there’s no news from the builders. The wife of 
Kelemen Kömüves can’t stand the waiting any longer. She says good bye to her little 
son and goes to visit her husband. The castle of Déva stands on a top of the hill so the 
builders could see all the traffic in the valley. When Kelemen Kömüves notices his 
horses and cart he starts to pray for a lightning that would frighten the horses away or 
for an accident that would prevent his wife from arriving at Déva. Unfortunately his 
prayers do not help and when Mrs. Kömüves arrives, the builders tell her about the 
agreement and throw her into the fire. Her ashes make the mortar strong enough to 
hold the bricks together so they can eventually complete building the castle and go 
home. Kelemen Kömüves meets his little son who wants to know where his mother 
was. He keeps asking about her and in the end the father takes him to the castle. There 
he calls out in desperation for his mother. His mother tries to respond but the bricks 
can’t let her move. The little son’s heart breaks so he now joins his mother.
There are a number of points in this sad story that can be related to the Hungarian 
character. First of all it is still not untypical to make enormous personal sacrifices for 
work.  Working overtime, taking on 2-3 jobs for the sake of the family is an economic 
necessity even though it deprives children of their parents. 
Fate, bad luck and the individual’s interest are also present in the ballad. It is by fate 
or curse that they cannot build the castle. To plead with fate or to counteract the curse 
you need to make a sacrifice. And what could be a better sacrifice than the closest 
person to you. Cruel but the ego makes these men agree that they would kill a wife. 
They of course exclude the possibility that it could be their own wife. And when it 
comes to sacrificing someone else’s wife or losing the payment they all vote for the 
sacrifice and totally forget about how they should love their neighbours.
 Conclusion: implications for organisational policy
To return to our metaphor of the shadow, whilst the shadow elements in the psyche 
are unconscious, they remain dynamically active. The rejected aspects of the 
developing ego continue to carry a sense of personal identity, and when they do 
impinge on awareness, according to Stevens (1999), they are experienced as 
liabilities: they are tinged with feelings of guilt and unworthiness, and bring fears of 
rejection. All these characteristics we have seen in the Hungarian literature; the 
defensiveness, martyrdom, guilt and competitive elements. If we fail to own these 
characteristics, then they are projected onto others as an unconscious act of ego 
preservation. In this way we deny our ‘badness’ and project it onto others who then 
become responsible for it. It is much easier to blame others. The continued survival 
under foreign rule has probably made it easier for Hungarians to blame their fate on 
the outsider – another example of the shadow at work. But bringing the shadow to 
light is not easy.  As Jung points out:
‘One does not become enlightened by imagining figures of light, but by making 
darkness conscious. The latter procedure however, is disagreeable and therefore not 
popular.’ (Jung, CW, para 335)
Thus, what we have seen at an institutional level is equally played out at an individual 
level. This resigned acceptance of ‘how things are’ tends to be, at an individual level, 
the way in which the ‘silent’ shadow, if it is not give expression, asserts itself.  Guilt 
and self-sacrifice are very particular ways in which an individual may rationalise his 
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or her inability to act, and take responsibility, whilst neurotic competition and drifting 
are negative patterns of behaviour which reinforce these inner feelings of guilt. Thus 
such patterns recreate and reinforce themselves, since the consequences of not 
acknowledging or recognising the shadow means that history repeats itself. In 
individual terms, it means that the adult never grows up, and at an institutional level, 
it means that creative harmonious growth is not possible. The consequences of 
constantly being ‘in the shadow’ of a ruling elite,  whilst sometimes benefiting 
materially, though never having any power has resulted, we believe in a peculiar 
‘alienation’ that somehow needs resolving if stagnancy and powerlessness is not again 
to result.
We noted in our introduction that whilst there is agreement that the transition has been 
made from command to market economy, three major problems have been 
highlighted ( Illes and Rees 2000). These are:
• High resistance, low morale, 'low ethics'
• Lack of innovation
• Lack of managerial knowledge and practices
It would seem that the shadow is already beginning to make itself felt. However, it is 
felt that increased education and managerial training will rectify this situation. We do 
not feel this is necessarily the case. We have shown here how 
patterns of behaviour that are captured at an institutional level are reproduced at a 
psychic level in the individual. Real change at the level of the individual is likely to 
take place over generations, and not simply in the relatively short life that people 
work in organisations. Behaviour in organisations is determined more by underlying 
unconscious motivations and drives that are passed down over generations than 
through the rhetoric of management manuals which exhort entrepreneurial behaviour.
We do not believe that the practices recently being imported from the West will 
provide the solutions that the Hungarian economy is looking for. Indeed, there is a 
possibility that the wholesale importation of such practices may add to the ‘alienated’ 
nature of Hungarian organisations, and increase the split between the rulers and the 
ruled, whether we conceive of this at an institutional level, or at the level of the 
individual psyche. If Hungarian organisations really want to make progress and 
become ‘learning’ organisations, then there needs to be space where such learning 
may take place. Rees (2000)  shows how entrenched values, which are not made 
conscious, may impede communication and creativity in the workplace. For her:
‘In a sense, learning here can be said to take place when habitual conditioning falls 
away for an instant, and the energy of the instinct, though still bounded, is released.’ 
We believe that if Hungarian organisations are to be lead by competent and creative 
managers, then the first steps should be to open up and integrate the energy of the 
shadow so that autonomy is achieved. Modern techniques of unlocking personal 
histories could be used creatively to help break down destructive or stagnant patterns 
of relating. At an organisational level, clarity of purpose, consistently open channels 
of communication, and a forum in which members of an organisation can challenge 
one another are prerequisites for organisational learning. Whilst these may appear to 
be luxuries in this time of tumultuous change – in order to succeed internationally, 
businesses could do well to understand what stifles and inhibits their workforces 
Clearly, the better we understand our psyche and its construction in relation to our 
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history  the better  we can understand ourselves in relation to others and the social 
institutions around us. In this way we can help ‘guide’ our organisational learning in 
the direction we want.  Whilst Elias showed us how civilisations develop through the 
repression of certain emotions (whether they are positive or negative) he also said that 
the more these blind processes become conscious, the better we can orientate 
ourselves within them. Unlocking Hungarian history, transforming the shadow would 
seem to us to be a more creative and ultimately profitable route to positively release 
the energy of the transition period. 
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Appendix 1 
AD 895-900 Seven Magyar tribes occupy the Carpathian basin.
1000 Foundation of the Hungarian kingdom; St. Stephen is the first 
Hungarian king.
1100-1500 Hungary is a rich and flourishing kingdom. In the 14th century it 
extends
 its boundaries to the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Adriatic Sea.
1526 The Hungarian army was defeated by the Turks 
1541-1686 Turkish occupation. 
1686-1867 Hungary is under Habsburg rule, in a semi-colonial situation. The 
revolution in 1848 and the War of Liberation are defeated in 1849 by 
the Austrian and Russian armies.
1867-1918 The Austrio-Hungarian Monarchy; spectacular economic, social and 
political development.
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1914-18 The Monarchy, allied with the German empire, is defeated in the First 
World War.
1920 In the Treaty of Trianon, Hungary loses two-thirds of its territory.
1920-45 Hungary is a kingdom without a king, governed by a conservative elite 
which obstructs social and political development. In the Second World 
War, the country fights on the side of the Germans but preserves its 
independence until 19th March 1944, when it is occupied by the 
Germans. When in April 1945, after a year of destructive fights, it is
 liberated by the Red Army, its capital and most of its industry is lying 
in ruins.
1945-7 The country is governed by a coalition of political parties; 
parliamentary 
democracy is disturbed by strong Soviet pressure and interference. At 
the elections of 1945, the Communist party gets only 17 per cent of 
votes. At the 1947 elections, in spite of large scale electoral cheating, it 
gets only 22 per cent.
1948 Turning point; the Hungarian Workers’ Party ( which is a forced 
alliance of the Communists and the Social Democrats) seizes power 
and 
establishes a totalitarian one-party rule.
1953 The first attempt at loosening the totalitarian rule; the first government 
of Imre Nagy.
1955 Come-back of the Stalinists
Oct.1956 National uprising against Soviet domination and the beginning of a 
democratic revolution against communist rule.
Nov. 1956 Soviet invasion; re-establishment of communist rule.
1957-1988 The Kádár regime. After bloody reprisals in 1957-8, and the execution 
of Imre Nagy and about 400 freedom fighters and politicians, a slow 
liberalisation begins in the mid 1960s. The 1970s are the Golden Age 
of 
Kádárism relative affluence, gradual relaxation of political control, 
enlightened and paternalistic absolutism. In 1968, the so-called New
Economic Mechanism is launched, which is the first important step on 
the road of transforming the centralised and planned state socialist 
economy into a market or mixed economy. In 1970, this reform 
process 
is obstructed by the conservative forces and slowed down by the 
resistance of Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership.
1980-1989 Deepening economic and social crisis.
1990 First free parliamentary election in forty-two years.
( adopted from Hankiss, 1990 pp275-277)
1990-2000 Multi-party system, private ownership, unemployment, adjusting from
backward technology to top technology. Major reduction in social 
welfare and security, no job security, increasing gap between the rich 
and the poor. The abolishment of free health care and free higher 
education. 
